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Israel vis-à-vis Iran in Syria: 
The Perils of Active Containment 
Iran’s Growing Influence in the Evolving Order in Syria Is Driving Israel to Change Its 
Mindset and Strategies 
Gil Murciano 
The perceived shift from chaos to an evolving order in Syria presents a challenge to 
Israel’s policy of limited intervention. Iran’s growing influence in Syria and its efforts 
to improve Hezbollah’s strategic capacities presents Israeli decision-makers with a 
sense of urgency to act now while the future settlement in Syria is still being shaped 
in order to avoid a fait accompli of an Iranian stronghold on Israel’s northern border. 
This notion is further enhanced by a perceived lack of a serious commitment from the 
main extra-regional powerbroker, Russia, as well as the US to Israel’s national security 
needs. During the last few months, the first signs of a change became apparent in 
Israel’s strategic approach as well as a new willingness to take active measures to con-
tain Iran’s strategic efforts in Syria. The combination of a new proactive Israeli policy 
and the lack of a security regime to regulate the situation increases the likelihood of 
an unintended escalation between the parties. Germany should use its relations and 
leverage vis-à-vis the two parties to promote a new security regime between Israel and 
Iran and help prevent a destructive escalation. 
 
The civil war in Syria had refuted the in-
formal security regime that had existed 
between Israel and Syria for more than four 
decades. Despite a continuous formal state 
of war between the countries and Syria’s 
active role as an important link in the Iran-
Hezbollah supply route, the border between 
the countries had remained silent since 
1974 through changing political and mili-
tary developments. In this context, although 
Israeli decision-makers considered the 
Bashar al-Assad regime to be an active 
enemy, they nevertheless perceived it as a 
“devil they know” – a predictable adversary 
who follows pre-acknowledged conventions 
and incentive structures. In this frame-
work, the pre-civil war Assad regime was 
perceived as a force of stability on the inter-
state level because of its ability and motiva-
tion to keep the Israel-Syria border quiet. 
This perception by Israel was based on two 
pillars: the basic notion of Assad as a stable 
ruler who exercised full control over his 
armed forces; and Israel’s ability to deter 
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Assad from direct military confrontation 
with Israel in the Golan Heights. 
The outbreak of the civil war in Syria 
rendered this strategic mindset irrelevant. 
Before the war, the Assad regime had en-
joyed considerable control in defining the 
scope and operational policy of Hezbollah 
in coordination with Iran and in accord-
ance with Syria’s interests. However, Iran 
and Hezbollah’s pivotal role in ensuring the 
Assad regime’s survival has created a grow-
ing dependency by Syria on their support 
and severely limits Syria’s ability and wil-
lingness to limit their freedom of action on 
its soil. The erosion in the regime’s sover-
eign decision-making capacity as well as its 
loss of effective control over the border area 
rendered the long-held deterrence equation 
of Israel vis-à-vis the Assad regime obsolete. 
Israel’s Policy during the Civil War: 
Selective Response 
Faced with ongoing chaos, the Israeli leader-
ship’s first strategic approach could be de-
scribed as a policy of selective response – an 
attempt to protect vital Israeli national secu-
rity interests while keeping Israel’s involve-
ment in the conflict in Syria to a necessary 
minimum. 
Two basic patterns can be traced in Israel’s 
actions and national security discourse dur-
ing this phase. First, Israel’s policy regarding 
Syria followed the lines of its wider “splendid 
isolation” approach towards the events of 
the “Arab Spring”. This relates to Israel’s 
ambition to preserve its separation from 
the chaotic political developments in the 
region by implementing a policy of non-
intervention. Consequently, Israeli policy-
makers exhibited general indifference 
regarding the political development of the 
Syrian civil war. Moreover, the changing 
circumstances in Syria – and specifically 
the rising dominance of jihadist militant 
groups near the Israel-Syria border – had 
quickly convinced Israeli decision-makers 
that Israel has little to gain from actively 
taking sides in this conflict between two 
forces potentially (or openly) hostile to Israel. 
Nevertheless, the developments in the 
war raging across the border eventually 
touched upon Israel’s national security 
interests. Although hoping to stay clear of 
the chaos, Israel was keen to contain imme-
diate threats evolving from the Syrian con-
flictual “eco-system”. These containment 
efforts defined two exceptional “friction 
spaces” within the chaos in which Israel 
operated in defiance of its general policy 
of limited intervention. 
On the first tier, Israel had acted to pre-
vent any attempts to turn the Israel-Syria 
border once again into a battlefront against 
Israel. The Israeli government had imple-
mented a series of measures to enforce a 
policy of zero-tolerance to emerging threats 
in the border’s vicinity. An illustrative 
example is the Israeli government’s policy 
of automatic retaliation in response to any 
spillover of the fighting between the regime 
and local opposition forces. The importance 
Israel ascribed to confronting evolving 
threats in the border area was demonstrated 
by Israel’s willingness to risk a direct con-
frontation with Iran to protect this impera-
tive. In 2014, the Israeli government received 
indications that Iran had initiated the build-
ing of what a senior Revolutionary Guard 
official coined “a second Hezbollah in Syria”, 
which would operate against Israel from 
the Golan Heights. In order to disrupt these 
efforts in January 2015, Israel launched an 
airstrike against a convoy of Hezbollah and 
Revolutionary Guards’ personnel, killing at 
least one senior Iranian officer. This Israeli 
doctrine is also illustrated by Israel’s efforts 
to increase its “soft power” in the border 
area by providing medical treatment to 
wounded civilians and opposition fighters. 
Some reports indicate that the scope of this 
support goes beyond the humanitarian level 
and includes financial and logistical support 
to local militias with the aim of creating a 
safe zone along Israel’s border with Syria. 
On the second, wider tier, the goal was 
to prevent an evolving threat to Israel’s 
strategic position vis-à-vis one of its main 
enemies – Hezbollah. According to senior 
IDF officers, since the start of the civil war 
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Israel has conducted “hundreds” of air-
strikes in Syria against convoys and storage 
facilities of advanced (“tie-breaking”) weap-
ons that were designed to reach Hezbollah 
in Lebanon. This policy was aimed at hin-
dering a substantial improvement in Hez-
bollah’s capacity to inflict damage on Israel 
in the framework of what is defined by 
Israel’s military planners as “the war be-
tween the wars”. Despite the show of force, 
these opportunity-based actions are, in 
their essence, a responsive measure meant 
to confront a gradually developing chal-
lenge to the strategic military imbalance 
between Israel and Hezbollah. 
The Point of Change: International Efforts 
for Settlement Challenge Israel’s Policy 
The last year of fighting in Syria has been 
characterised by a gradual shift from chaos 
to an evolving order that is based on the 
parties’ realisation that the endgame is 
near. The shift in the balance of power in 
favour of the Assad regime and its allies 
also signifies a new phase of conflict man-
agement. Current efforts led by Russia and 
the US to reach stabilising settlements have 
a direct impact on Israel’s strategic inter-
ests. In the Israeli mindset, these settle-
ments reflect directly on a key security con-
cern – the question of Iran’s growing mili-
tary presence in Syria and its perceived 
attempts to transform Syria into a platform 
for future military activity against Israel. 
A core element of Israel’s national secu-
rity policy of the last two decades has been 
to contain Iran’s offensive capabilities vis-à-
vis Israel. A key aspect has been the need 
to limit Iran and its proxies’ freedom of 
operation in neighbouring countries. Israel 
is currently facing the emergence of a new 
order in the Syrian arena, in which Iran’s 
growing military and political influence is 
becoming a fait accompli. For Israel, the 
worst-case scenario is the transformation of 
Syria into an Iranian stronghold on Israel’s 
northern border, as part of what Israeli 
Defence Minister Liebermann defined as a 
“Shi’ite corridor from Iran to Damascus”. 
The Israeli mindset is clearly apparent in the 
connection made by Prime Minister Netan-
yahu between the shift to evolving order in 
Syria and the growing threat from Iran: “The 
current situation emanates from a welcome 
development – the defeat of ISIS (in Syria). 
However, the problem is that where ISIS 
exits, Iran enters.” Netanyahu was also clear 
about his perception of the ultimate goal 
of Iran’s Syria project, accusing Iran of 
establishing its military presence in order 
“to take over Syria, to ‘Lebanonize’ Syria”. 
The evolving reality in Syria heightens 
Israel’s sense of urgency to act. Israeli 
decision-makers view the current phase in 
the Syrian civil war as a crucial time frame, 
during which the main terms and rules of 
engagement are being shaped. Israel’s con-
cern is that a failure to challenge Iran’s 
growing presence in Syria could result in 
permanent developments that would later 
be hard to alter. Ironically, it is therefore 
the developing order, rather than the chaos, 
that is influencing Israel to change its scope 
of involvement in the Syrian arena in order 
to avoid a state of strategic inferiority. 
The Israeli government’s concerns about 
the evolving reality of Iran’s presence in 
Syria are heightened by the perceived lack 
of commitment on behalf of Russia and the 
US to incorporate Israel’s security needs 
into the design of future agreements in 
Syria. Despite extensive diplomatic efforts, 
the Israeli leadership has so far been mostly 
unsuccessful in convincing Russia and the 
US to implement measures to limit Iran’s 
current presence and efforts. Israel also 
failed to convince them to act against the 
proliferation of advanced weapons being 
delivered to Hezbollah by Iran. American 
diplomatic support had been an important 
aspect in Israel’s pre-civil war containment 
efforts vis-à-vis Iran and Hezbollah. How-
ever, the perceived disregard by the Obama 
administration, followed by the ambivalent 
attitude of the Trump administration, 
towards the question of Iran’s presence in 
Syria has led the Israeli leadership to con-
clude that they can no longer rely on the 
US to represent their interests in future 
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settlements. A common perception in Israel 
is that, apart from the focus on ISIS, the US 
administration lacks concrete policy guide-
lines regarding the Syrian arena. The exten-
sive diplomatic efforts made by the Israeli 
government during the last two years vis-à-
vis Russia improved tactical military coordi-
nation between the nations in Syria and, to 
this point, provided Israel with relative free-
dom to operate in Syrian airspace. Never-
theless, the Israeli leadership had achieved 
little success in realising its strategic goal 
of convincing the Russians to actively limit 
Iran’s influence in Syria or to act against 
Iran’s efforts to arm Hezbollah. In this 
context, although Russia seems to have 
accepted Israel’s demand for a buffer zone 
between Iran-backed militias and the Israel-
Syria border, they seem less attentive to 
Israel’s demands for long-term limitations 
on their military ally’s presence in Syria. 
In concrete terms, in the Israeli political 
and military leaderships’ perception, the 
strategic reality of Iran’s evolving domi-
nance in Syria presents two main challenges 
to Israel’s national security. 
A Potential “Second” Iranian Front 
vis-à-vis Israel 
The deployment of elite Iranian and Iran-
backed forces in Syria provides Iran with a 
strategic advantage in future conflicts with 
Israel. The Iranian-backed forces in Syria cur-
rently number approximately 1,000 Iranian 
troops from the Revolutionary Guards’ Quds 
Force, around 7,000 Hezbollah fighters, and 
10,000 members of other Shia militias. In 
analysing the potential threat of Iran’s fu-
ture military activity in Syria, Israeli deci-
sion-makers focus on three main elements: 
 the possibility that Iran would deploy 
advanced weapons systems, to be placed 
under Iran’s direct control on Syrian soil. 
These include mainly surface-to-surface 
missiles, air defence systems, and anti-
ship missiles; 
 Iran’s attempt to build or use existing 
military infrastructure in Syria – such 
as air and naval bases; 
 Iran’s build-up and redeployment of its 
forces in Syria to the Israel-Syria border. 
The Upgrading of Hezbollah’s 
Strategic Capabilities 
In the Israeli leadership’s perception, a 
leading threat is Hezbollah’s consistent 
effort to acquire advanced offensive weap-
ons systems, which would increase its 
ability to target Israel in future conflicts. 
One main example is the proliferation of 
high-precision missiles, such as the Iran-
manufactured, GPS-guided Raad missiles, 
to Hezbollah. The acquirement of these 
systems would drastically improve Hez-
bollah’s ability to attack key strategic 
civilian and military targets in Israel and, 
consequently, substantially increase the 
price Israel would have to pay in future 
conflicts. Another central aspect of Israel’s 
threat perception focusses on Iran’s re-
ported attempts to provide Hezbollah with 
independent production capabilities of 
advanced weapons and munitions. Such 
capabilities would increase the organisa-
tion’s operational resilience and flexibility 
in future conflicts. 
Following its previous policy of limited 
intervention, Israel now finds itself left out 
of a crucial process of conflict management, 
which reflects directly on its core long-term 
national interests. Israel’s discontent was 
clearly apparent in the Israeli leadership’s 
public criticism of the Russia-US ceasefire 
deal in southern Syria (July 2017), which a 
senior Israeli official defined as a “very bad 
deal” that mostly benefits Iran. Despite dis-
tinct efforts by Israel, the first draft of the 
agreement did not include any mention of 
Iran or the question of its long-term pres-
ence in Syria. 
In such diplomatic circumstances – 
Israeli decision-makers now concur – the 
protection of Israel’s basic need to contain 
Iran could no longer be met by responsive 
means and a policy of limited intervention 
alone. In the new mindset of Israeli deci-
sion-makers, it is a long-term threat that 
Israel should prevent “at any cost”, and one 
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that requires Israel’s readiness to act in-
dependently, if necessary. 
From Selective Response to 
Active Containment? 
A combined analysis of Israel’s diplomatic 
agenda, military operations, and strategic 
discourse of the last few months provides 
initial indications of a change in the basic 
attitudes of Israel’s decision-makers to-
wards the evolving order in Syria. These 
indications appear in both the discourse 
and actions of the Israeli government. 
The analysis emphasises the first signs of 
Israel’s willingness to intervene both politi-
cally and militarily in order to avoid an 
erosion of its national security interests 
in Syria. In this framework, Israel’s recent 
steps emphasise a willingness to take larger 
risks in challenging an undesired status 
quo evolving in Syria. 
A Change in Strategic Discourse 
During the last year, there has been a 
change in the strategic discourse of Israel’s 
political-military leadership regarding the 
basic definition of the challenges develop-
ing on Israel’s northern front. There is a 
new tendency to blur the line separating 
Iran’s influence in Lebanon (through Hez-
bollah) and its influence in Syria, and in-
stead to treat it as part of a unified theatre 
of operations. Whereas before the civil war 
Israeli military planners treated Lebanon 
and Syria as two (hostile) arenas dictating 
different restraints and rules of engage-
ment, the new operational logic defines 
them as part of the same “operational eco-
system”, the common denominator of which 
is Iran’s influence. In current Israeli assess-
ments, a spillover of direct confrontation in 
Syria to Lebanon, or vice versa, is a highly 
likely scenario. According to Israel’s Minis-
ter of Defence, Israel no longer speaks of a 
Lebanese arena, but is instead dealing with 
a “single northern arena”, consisting of 
Syria, Lebanon, Hezbollah, and the Assad 
regime and its supporters. 
Enhanced Diplomatic Campaign 
In the last few months, the matter of Iran’s 
influence in Syria has constituted a first-
priority issue in Israel’s foreign policy 
agenda vis-à-vis the main extra-regional 
stakeholders. The topic has dominated the 
Israeli leadership’s dialogue with Russia, 
including the recent Netanyahu-Putin 
meeting in Sochi (August 23) and the visit 
of Russia’s Defence Minister to Israel (Octo-
ber 15). In parallel, despite growing dis-
appointment in the Trump administra-
tion’s attitude towards the topic, the Israeli 
leadership has recently invested consider-
able effort in alerting the US administra-
tion to the potential threats of Iran’s grow-
ing influence in Syria. In this framework, 
a special delegation of senior security offi-
cials, led by the heads of Mossad and Israel’s 
Military Intelligence, visited the US and 
met with Trump’s strategic circle (August 
18). In addition, the topic of Iran’s influ-
ence in Syria has also dominated Israeli 
leadership meetings with European leaders: 
The topic was at the centre of Netanyahu’s 
meeting with President Macron (July 16) 
and President Rivlin’s meeting with Chan-
cellor Merkel (September 7). 
Signs of Change in Military 
Mode of Operations 
Israel’s first (known) military action in Syria 
since the conclusion of the July 2017 cease-
fire has distinctively different features from 
the ones witnessed during the last five years 
of the civil war. According to media reports, 
Israel launched an airstrike on September 7 
against a research and/or production facil-
ity near Masyaf, in the Hama Governorate, 
which belongs to Syria’s Scientific Studies 
and Research Center (CERS) – a Syrian gov-
ernmental agency in charge of the research 
and development of strategic and uncon-
ventional weapons. The exact function of 
the facility is still a matter of speculation, 
but most reports indicate it is the produc-
tion site of high-precision missiles designed 
for use by the Syrian Army and Hezbollah; 
other reports speak of a production site for 
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chemical weapons. Regardless of the exact 
target of the attack, this airstrike consti-
tutes an extraordinary operation in the 
ongoing portfolio of Israeli operations in 
Syria, not merely due to its unique opera-
tional nature, but also based on its diplo-
matic meaning. 
During the last four years, most Israeli 
airstrikes had been directed against what 
could be defined as opportunity-based tar-
gets, such as convoys and storage facilities. 
However, the September 7 airstrike was 
directed against a strategic infrastructure 
target, and one of unique strategic impor-
tance – a central component of Syria’s 
manufacturing capacity of advanced mis-
siles and/or chemical weapons. The choice 
of target demonstrates the importance the 
Israeli government ascribes to curtailing 
Syria and Hezbollah’s efforts to gain stra-
tegic capabilities. Moreover, this step also 
demonstrates Israel’s willingness to step up 
its efforts to achieve this goal, even at the 
risk of possible retaliation by Iran/Syria/ 
Hezbollah and/or damage to their relations 
with Russia. In this context, the airstrike 
was launched during the largest IDF exer-
cise in the last 20 years (“Or Hadagan”). This 
exact timing could indicate that special 
measures were taken to increase readiness 
in case of retaliation, and therefore reflects 
on the unique operational profile of this 
specific airstrike. 
Furthermore, the airstrike was launched 
against a target in an area with a strong 
Russian military presence (less than 80 km 
from the Hmeimim airport, currently oper-
ated by the Russian Air Force). The choice to 
attack a target positioned deep within the 
Russian “sphere of control” can be inter-
preted as an attempt to convey a message 
of discontent to Russia that Israel will not 
sit by idly while Russia ignores Syria and 
Hezbollah’s efforts to upgrade their stra-
tegic capabilities. Amos Yadlin, the former 
head of Israel’s Military Intelligence who 
defined the airstrike as “not routine”, also 
referred to it as a statement directed at the 
extra-regional powers that Israel would not 
allow Syria to produce strategic weapons. He 
connected the timing of the attack directly 
with Israeli leadership’s sentiment that Rus-
sia and the US are “ignoring the red lines 
defined by Israel on the matter”. 
Israel’s unusual decision to attack (Octo-
ber 16) a Syrian anti-aircraft battery in re-
sponse to a missile fired on Israeli Air Force 
planes (after it ignored similar incidents in 
the past) during the visit of Russia’s Defence 
Minister to Israel is yet another indication 
of the political message of recent military 
steps by Israel. 
Reacting to Iran’s Growing Influence: 
Three Possible Approaches by Israel 
Considering these developments in Israel’s 
modus operandi, three scenarios for future 
Israeli policy are conceivable, each of which 
reflects a different strategic approach. 
Policy Choice 1:  
Israeli de facto Acceptance of 
Iran’s Presence 
Israel’s response to the evolving situation 
in Syria will be limited to continuous diplo-
matic protests and technical adjustments 
in developing the IDF’s force structure. The 
Israeli leadership would basically come to 
terms with Iran’s presence in Syria and the 
increase in the strategic military capacities 
of Hezbollah and learn to accept Iran’s new 
strategic position in Syria as a given fact. 
“More of the same” could therefore be ex-
pected – the continuation of the Israeli 
policy of opportunity-based attacks on con-
voys and the first-tier containment of Iran’s 
attempts to “activate” the Golan Heights 
front. Israel will not make any fundamental 
efforts to change the “rules of the game” on 
the wider tier. In such a scenario, the recent 
airstrike on CERS should be seen as a one-
time occurrence. The realisation of this sce-
nario reduces the likelihood of an escala-
tion of the situation into a violent conflict 
in the short term. 
Nevertheless, the policy line the Israeli 
government has adopted since the July 
ceasefire, in both discourse and action, de-
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creases the probability of Israel’s accept-
ance of the situation and “regression” 
towards a responsive policy. 
Policy Choice 2:  
An Israeli Active Containment with the Risk 
of Unintended Escalation 
Iran’s growing influence in Syria, combined 
with Russia and the US’s continued absten-
tion from taking active measures to curb this 
influence, will lead Israeli decision-makers 
to apply an independent, proactive effort 
to contain it. In this framework, Israel will 
focus on enforcing a new set of “red lines” 
(in parallel to previous ones) regarding 
Iran’s standing in the Syrian arena and its 
efforts to increase the strategic capacities of 
its allies. Such “red lines” may include the 
deployment of advanced weapons systems 
on Syrian soil, the proliferation/reconstruc-
tion of Syrian/Hezbollah production capa-
bilities of advanced weapons systems 
and weapons of mass destruction, and the 
deployment of Iranian/Iranian-backed 
forces in naval/air bases. The recent air-
strike could be indicative of a new Israeli 
operational logic. 
In order to implement this policy of 
active containment, Israel is likely to utilise 
a combination of coordinated diplomatic 
and military measures. The usage of the 
latter is expected to increase the intensity 
of Israel’s conflict with its enemies. First, 
it could place Israel in direct confrontation 
with Iran. If previous Israeli airstrikes were 
mostly directed at Iran’s proxies (Hezbol-
lah) and allies (Syria), the set of targets 
related to Israel’s new “red lines” increase 
the chances of intentional or unintentional 
damage to Iranian forces and/or assets. 
Second, the new policy is likely to increase 
the level of confrontation with both Syria 
and Hezbollah. Continuous airstrikes 
against Syrian/Hezbollah/Iranian strategic 
infrastructure are likely to eventually pro-
voke a response. Third, in the long run, 
an Israeli active containment policy is ex-
pected to damage the delicate framework 
of Israel-Russia relations. Further Israeli 
airstrikes against Syria’s strategic infra-
structure might limit Russia’s willingness 
to place restraints on Syrian retaliatory 
motivations in the future. Lastly, from a 
regional perspective, Israel’s active con-
tainment could further disrupt current 
efforts to stabilise Syria and create frame-
works for conflict management. 
Policy Choice 3:  
Israel’s Acceptance of Iran’s Presence 
under Pre-defined Terms 
Israel will informally accept a limited mili-
tary presence of Iran-backed forces in Syria 
under specific restrictions agreed upon with 
Russia and the international community. 
There have been recent unconfirmed re-
ports on Russia’s efforts to find a mutually 
agreeable formula that would allow for the 
continued presence of Iranian-backed forces 
in Syria while satisfying Israel’s concerns 
about Syria becoming a platform for Iran’s 
aggression. 
If these reports are credible, they high-
light Russia’s ambitions to protect its core 
interest of preserving the Assad regime by 
preventing a destructive conflict between 
Israel and their client. Nevertheless, in this 
stage, it is hard to assess the depth of Rus-
sia’s commitment, the length to which the 
Israeli government would be willing to en-
trust their core interests to Russia, or their 
ability to find a mutual compromise with 
Russia’s positions. 
Chances for Escalation 
The current power play in Syria contains 
clear de-escalatory factors that decrease the 
risk of an all-out war between the parties. 
First, Russia’s presence as a powerbroker in 
the arena significantly reduces the chances 
of intentional escalation by Israel or the 
Iran-backed camp. A violent confrontation 
in Syria would be detrimental to Russia’s 
efforts to rebuild the Syrian regime’s capac-
ities. Russia’s reported involvement in pre-
venting Syria from reacting to the CERS 
airstrike and its reported efforts to discuss 
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Israel’s concerns could be seen as testimony 
to its de-escalatory motivation. As a clash 
with Russia is highly undesired for all par-
ties involved, Russia’s involvement presents 
a disincentive for all parties to make escala-
tory moves. However, as noticed during the 
recent Israeli airstrike on CERS, Russia’s 
presence does not serve as a decisive deter-
rent against Israeli military risk-taking in 
Syria. Second, at this stage, the lack of im-
mediate motivation by Israel or Iran to 
escalate the situation into a high-intensity 
conflict reduces the short-term likelihood 
of intentional escalation by either party. 
Nevertheless, an Israeli adoption of a 
proactive approach of active containment 
(Policy Choice 2) increases the likelihood of 
unintentional escalation. Such escalation is 
most likely to materialise if Israel continues 
its airstrikes against strategic infrastructure 
targets. If these attacks become a new Isra-
eli operational policy, the need for Iran and 
Syria to retaliate is expected to increase – 
and Russia’s willingness to stop such a re-
taliation to decrease. In response to Israel’s 
recent airstrikes (October 18), Iran’s Chief 
of Staff stated that Iran considers a situa-
tion allowing the “Zionist Regime” to attack 
Syria whenever it wants as unacceptable. 
Chances of such retaliation are also expected 
to increase as Syria slowly regains its inde-
pendent military capabilities. Syrian and/or 
Iranian retaliation (carried from Syria or 
Lebanon) could then trigger a self-intensify-
ing dynamic of escalatory actions and reac-
tions, which could eventually lead to a sys-
temic conflict, similar to the dynamic that 
precipitated the Second Lebanon War (2006). 
From a structural point of view, Israel’s 
attempt to actively oppose Iran’s growing 
influence in Syria increases the potential 
friction between Israel and the Iran-backed 
camp. Israel and Iran appear in the Syrian 
arena as two regional actors that possess 
clashing interests while sharing a height-
ened sense of urgency to fulfil them. Simul-
taneously, following the collapse of recent 
understandings, the parties are operating 
in the absence of a security regime to pre-
define their mutual expectations and regu-
late their interactional moves. In such a 
situation, miscalculations and misinter-
pretations and their potential of becoming 
generators of violent conflict increase 
significantly. 
Options for Germany 
Considering the dire implications on the 
regional and global levels resulting from a 
direct confrontation, Germany should take 
an active part in the efforts to formulate a 
security regime between Israel and Iran in 
Syria. In this context, Germany is in a unique 
position to support an international effort 
to create such an arrangement. First, it is 
both a strategic ally of Israel and party to 
an ongoing dialogue with Iran, with which 
it enjoys economic leverage, relative cred-
ibility, and political access. Second, Germany 
has practical experience in the delicate 
practice of mediating informal agreements 
between Israel, Iran, and Hezbollah. In con-
crete terms, Germany could fulfil two pos-
sible roles in this process. First, it could 
serve as a facilitator of the process, con-
ducting separate dialogues with the two 
stakeholders in order to reach an informal 
arrangement. Second, it could take the role 
of an active mediator, applying pressure 
(alongside other members of the inter-
national community) on Iran to limit its 
military efforts in Syria. Such involvement 
would enable Germany to use its strategic 
capacities to foster regional stability and 
prevent underlying dynamics from esca-
lating into a destructive conflict, the 
shockwaves of which are bound to impact 
across the Mediterranean and into Europe. 
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